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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
EMERGENCY RELIEFVENTING OF THE INFRARED TELESCOPE
LIQUID HELIUM DEWAR
INTRODUCTION
The 250-1iter helium dewar of the Infrared Telescope (IRT) experi-
ment presents a potential explosion hazard, if an accident should occur
and if relief provisions are inadequate. This report discusses possible
sources of catastrophic heat input to the liquid vessel and the resulting
relief p:rocess, and shows that the safety provisions are adequate for any
"reasonable" accident.
DEWARSUBSYSTEM
The IRT dewar, shown schematically in Figure l, consists of a 250-
liter cylindrical liquid vessel surrounded by a concentric array of super-
insulation (SI) and three vapor-cooled shields (VCS), all within a strong
aluminum outer shell. The space between the liquid vessel and outer
-6
shell is evacuated to a very good vacuum (perhaps 10 tort). The
liquid vessel is supported by a fiberglass/epoxy composite neck tube at
the top and a set of fiberglass/epoxy support straps at the bottom. At
the top of the neck tube is the evacuated transfer assembly (TA), con-
taining 151l,vent and relief control plumbing, thermal shields which are
connected to the VCS of the dewar, and SI. The IRT external plumbing
is shown in Figure 2.
Liquid helium is loaded into the dewar subsystem through a bayonet
coupling and a "worm" fillvalve V6, 'lcold fillvalve V7 and a 1/2 in.
(1.27 cm) outside diameter smooth wall tube whose total length is perhaps
100 in. (2.5 m). When fillingis completed, V7 is closed, a fillline relief
valve Vl5 (RV4) is inserted into the bayonet coupling, V6 is left open,
and the line between V7 ;_n(lVI5 (RV4) is evacuated. Burst diaphra.ffm
BI, discussed later, is situated in parallel with V7. The catastrophic
relief path is out the fillline, through BI and RV4 to the atmosphere.
Helium is vented from the dewar along n more complex path. In
normal loadinR" operations, plug bypass valve V5 is open and carries the
majority of the vent flow; dewar bypass valve V17 is closed, and ventinp:
vapor enters a junction at the downstream side of the porous plug. At
this point the Flow splits into (1) a <lewar flow passing into a heat
exchanp:er with rei')tively b,rge effective fl_)w diameter and leaving the TA
through vent valve V13. _md (2) a c..).vn_t_,t flow consisting of heat
exchanger tubing several meters long .dthin a separate cryost_t vessel;
this flow leaves the cryostat throuR'h VI4 (RV1). When liquid londin_.
operations are complete, V5 is closed ;,rid venting vapor passes throu.p.'],
the porous plug. thence through the TA and crvostat heat exch:,n_,:ors
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Figure 2. Infrared Telescope Envelope and Plumbing Diagram.
and vent paths. Also at this time V16 (RV3) is inserted into the vent
bayonet, Vl3 is left open, and VI4 (RV1) is closed. Venting continues
from the dewar and cryostat through external warm lines to an overboard
vent pipe (or to an on-board vacuum pump). Burst diaphragm B2 is in
parallel with the porous plug and VS. The catastrophic relief path (assum-
ing the porous plug is somehow blocked) is out the vent line, throuv.h B2,
then in parallel through the cryostat to RVI and through the TA to RV3.
If the liquid helium in the liquid vessel is in the normal state, its
temperature is 4.2 K, and the pressure within the plumbing system is
approximately 1 atra (760 torr). When the dewar is prepared for flight,
the liquid is converted to the superfluid state at a temperature below
2.17 K, and the pressure within the entire plumbing system is below 0.05
arm (38 torr). In proper operation in space, the temperature and pressure
will be approximately 1.6 K and 8 × 10 -3 atm (6 torr), respectively.
Thus if all operations and conditions are nominal, the hi_'hest pressure
within the experiment will be approximately 1 atm. If all flow control
valves are shut and the experiment is left untended while containing
liquid, as may occur after landing at the end of the flight mission, the
evaporating helium will pass through the porous plug and vent through
relief valves RVI and RV3, which are set to open at approximately 6 psid
(20.7 psia). The maximum internal pressure is then 20.7 psia (1.4 atm).
Discussion of the conditions under which the dewar system meets the
"pressure vessel" criteria of the Spacelab Payload Accommodation Hand-
book (SPAH) is contained in Appendix A.
RELIEFVENTING PROBLEM
We are concerned here with an anomalous situation in which some
accident causes a sudden, rapid influx of heat to the fluid, causing its
pressure to rise rapidly to a very high level. We are interested in the
answers to the following questions:
I) What is the heat flux which might be experienced by the liquid
helium in the worst, "reasonable" circumstances?
2) Given this heat flux, can the dewar relief system safely vent
the dewar without causing the vessels or plumbing to rupture?
CATASTROPHIC HEATFLUX
Concerning the first question, the heat flux to the liquid helium can
be estimated from Figure 3, which is extracted from Figure 6.3 of
Reference 1. This figure presents the heat flux plotted as a function
of container surface area for a variety of insulation configurations. The
liquid vessel for the IRT dewar is a right circular cylinder 28 in. in
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Figure 3. Estimated Heat Flux versus Area
of Liquid Container.
diameter by 28 in. maximum length, having domed ends. Its area is,
therefore, approximately 3600 in. 2 (= 26 ft2) I. The vessel is surrounded
by superinsulation blankets, with a total thickness of approximately 2 in.
(5 cm), and three nearly continuous VCS. If the 0.25 in. thick outer
shell of the dewar were punctured, e.g., by a fork lift, air would imme-
diately enter the guard vacuum space. The shields and insulation would
somewhat inhibit the flow and condensation of air onto the liquid vessel.
It seems reasonably conservative, therefore, to use the curve in the figure
for air condensation onto a liquid helium vessel protected by l in. (2.54
cm) of SI. The corresponding heat flux to the liquid helium is 10,000
Btu/hr (= 3 kW).
If a puncture occurred in the transfer assembly or cryostat, the
heat flux to the liquid would be much less. The vacuum spaces of the
TA and cry.star are common to that within the dewar neck but separate
from the guard vacuum of the dewar itself. Air entering the TA could
condense on the plumbing and on only a small area of the liquid vessel
at the base of the neck.
RELIEF PROCESS, 6.5PSID BURST DIAPHRAGMS
To answer the preceding second question, one must consider the
sequence of events which will occur when the stored helium receives an
anomalous heat flux. The most serious physical state of the dewar will
exist if the puncture accident previously described should occur when the
dewar is completely full and if, at the same time, the porous plug is com-
pletely blocked. In practice it will be nearly impossible to completely fill
the dewar, so that some ullage will always be present; that ullage will then
increase with time as liquid is slowly boiled away. Complete blockage of
the porous plug would be difficult to achieve, since the small pores, whose
diameters are less than approximately 4 × 10-4in. (i0 _m), would not be
significantly affected by debris of larger dimensions. However, in the
following a full dewar and a blocked plug are assumed, the most pessimistic
situation.
In this configuration the liquid will warm isochorically (constant
volume) and the pressure will rise until the weaker of the two burst dia-
phragms ruptures, at which time the fluid will begin to flow along the
appropriate relief path, previously described. If the heat flow is great
enough and the single vent path is inadequate, the pressure will eventu-
ally rise until the second burst diaphragm ruptures (at a slightly higher
pressure), opening the second relief path.
I. A more accurate calculation taking into account the domed heads shows
2
that the surface area is less than 3200 in.
If pressure should continue to rise, the next expected design relief
pressure is the burst pressure of the liquid vessel itself and its plumbing.
A failure of any of these internal components would release fluid into the
guard vacuum volumes of the dewar (where the air is already condensing),
the transfer assembly, or the cryostat. As the fluid comes in contact with
the warm structure, the heat flux would increase considerably and the
fluid e_-pand more rapidly. Additional relief valves (RV5, RV6 or RV2)
would open to conduct this added flow, and venting would also occur
through the original puncture.
The burst diaphragms B I and B2 are welded steel units. Originally,
they were expected to have a burst pressure at liquid helium temperature
of 65 +15 psid (4.4 +0.4 arm). With room temperature proof and burst
pressures specified for the dewar vessel at 90 psi (6.1 atm) and 120 psi
(8.2 atm), respectively, it was clear that the burst diaphragms would open
well before the internal pressure could approach the proof pressure in a
catastrophic situation. The question then addressed was whether the
relief paths are adequate to empty the dewar safely. The analysis of dewar
relief through the 65 psid or 4.4 atm diaphragms follows.
After the first release of this report it was found necessary to use
in the IRT burst diaphragms with a measured burst pressure nt liquid
helium temperature of I15 psid or 7.8 arm. The analysis of this case is
described after the 65 psid case.
The physical state of the system is shown in Figure 4, which was
extracted from Figure 2.7 of Reference 1. It plots pressure, P, versus
specific internal energy, u, for helium. Curves of constant specific vol-
ume, u, and of constant temperature, T, are also shown. We postulate
the following process:
Initially the 250-liter vessel is completely full of liquid, and its state
is on tY,e saturated liquid portion of the phase boundary. If the liquid
is initially at its normal boiling point (NBP), 4.2 K, its density n is 0.125
g/cm 3, -_)is 8.0 cm3/g, and the total fluid mass, m o, is 31.25 kg (point
A, Figure 4). If the liquid is initially superfluid, T = 1.6 K, P = 6 torr
• g/cm 3 . cm 3 = 36.25 kg
--:8 x 10-3 atm, p = 0 145 , u = 6 9 /g, and m °
(Point A_).
Heating commences without venting and the system moves upward
along the appropriate constant u curve until the pressure reaches 4.4 arm,
the burst diaphragm relief pressure. Since the critical pressure for helium
is 2.2 atm, the fluid is supercritica] throughout the relief process. The
internal energy of the helium, u, will increase due to the heat flux, Q, as
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For the present case of Q = 3 kW,
fi = 3000 J/s = 0.096[Js], NBP ,
3. 124 × 104 g
and (2)
_a = 3000 = 0.083[J] , superfluid.
3.625 × 104 Lgsj
From Figure 4 we see that during this process the internal energy of the
normal fluid increases from 9.1 J/g to 11.2 J/g or _u = 2.2 J/g, while for
superfluid, Au = 2.0 J/g. Thus the times required for the pressure to"
reach the relief point are
Au _ 2.2
tre:Lief - fl 0.096
- 22.9 [s]; NBP
2.0 = 24.1 Is]; superfluid (3)
0.083
This demonstrates that if an accident should occur on the ground, a
short time is available for personnel to clear the vicinity of the experi-
ment before the relief venting begins. The relief plumbing exits are
directed upward and away from the experiment and will not impinge on
other apparatus.
When the first burst diaphragm ruptures and venting begins, speci-
fic volume begins to increase and the system moves on Figure 4 in the
direction of increasing u. As time increases, the instantaneous conditions
within the dewar will depend on the mass remaining and the heat input.
Those conditions will control the mass flow rate.
The maximum mass flow rate for an orifice is given by equation (4.17)
of Reference 2 as follows:
p
fi_max - A R \k+l/ T1/----2 (4)
where
A = area (cm2)
P = pressure (atm)
T = fluid temperature (K)
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R = gas constant = 2.08[_K]
k = ratio of specific heats = 1.67.
The limiting diameters of the two relief systems are those of the fill and
vent tubes, each with 1.27 cm O.D., 0.08 cm wall thickness, and approx-
2
imately 250 cm length. Their flow areas are 0.98 cm , and equation (4)
becomes
fh = 158.2 P-P-- [g/s] (orifice) (5)
max
This result must be corrected for the finite pipe length.
number is given by
The Reynolds
= _ (6)
Re AU '
where D is diameter and _ is viscosity. To find R e , we estimate the mass
flow rate which will exist immediately after the first diaphragm ruptures.
We let P = 4.4 atm and T = 5.1 K in equation (5) and find
_max = 308[g/s](orifice). (7)
The viscosity is given in Reference 3 for T = 5 K and P = 4.5 atm as
34.7 × 10 -6 g/cm s, and equation (6) becomes
R = 1.2 × 107 . (8)
e
From Figure 6.15 of Reference 2, we see that for smooth pipes the friction
factor 4f is 8 x 10 -3 . Figure 6.9 of Reference 2 plots the ratio of maximum
flow for a pipe to maximum isentropic (orifice) flow versus 4f L/D, where
L is pipe length = 250 cm; then 4f L/D is 1.6, and the figure shows that
max, pipe
-mmax, orifice
= 0.6 (9)
Therefore, friction in the pipe limits the maximum flow, and equation (5)
becomes
rh = 0.6 x 158.2 P
max, pipe
Thus
10
rh = 94.9
max
= 189.8
m,_tx
[g/s] (single relief path)
f-y-
P-P-- [g/s] (two relief paths),
¢-_
(10)
with P in atm and T in K.
Rather than attempt an exact solution of the venting problem, we
will make the approximation that the mass flow rate is constant for some
small time interval, t. The instantaneous fluid mass re(t) remaining in
the dewar at the end of the interval will be
re(t) = mo(t) - rfl(t)t, (11)
where too(t) is the fluid mass at the beginning of the interval. The
specific internal energy will increase during the interval due to the heat
flux, Q. If we assume that the heat is absorbed by the mass at the end
of the interval, then
E÷s]£](t) - m(t) mo(t) Qrh(t)t " (12)
This rate is somewhat more severe than the average rate during the
interval, since the final mass is less than the average mass. To obtain
u(t) we integrate equation (12),
u(t) = _(t) dt + C
¢_ In (1 _n(t) t)+ Uo(t) [g ] (13)tfl(t) mo(t) '
where Uo(t) is the specific energy at the beginning of the time interval.
The specific volume of the remaining fluid is
_ V V Fcm3q (14)
v(t) m(_ = mo(t) - dl(t)t
11
RELIEFCALCULATIONS,65PSID BURST DIAPHRAGMS
The computation proceeds as follows: At the burst point we are
given the liquid pressure, mass, and specific volume, and, from Figure
4, we find specific internal energy and temperature. From Equation (10)
we calculate the mass flow rate, which will be held constant for the first
time interval. Then equation (11) gives the new mass at the end of the
interval, equation (14) Ki've_ the new specific volume, and equation (13)
gives the new specific internal energy. From the u-v coordinate of the
new state point on Figure 4, we read the new pressure and temperature,
find a new n_, and so forth.
The computation was performed for dewars initially filled com-
pletely with normal helium and with superfluid helium, each receiving a
constant 3 kW heat input as a result of a large puncture in the outer
shell, as previously discussed. The time interval used in the calculation
for the normal dewar was 1 s; for the superfluid dewar it was 5 s. The
results are plotted in Figure 4. The initial points of the curves are A
and A', respectively, on the saturated vapor pressure boundary. Condi-
tions at A and A' were previously given. For each case one burst disk
ruptures when the system first reaches 4.4 atm, points B and B', respec-
Lively. Conditions at point B are: T = 5.14 K, v = 8.0 em3/g, u = 11.3
J/g, m = 31.25 kg, and _ = 185.6 g/s; at point B': T = 3.6 K, v = 6.9
cm3/g, u = 6.3 J/g, m = 36.25 kg, and _h = 220.1 g/s. The pressure
then immediately falls, and an opportunity for the second burst disk to
rupture does not occur until points C and C', where the pressure returns
to 4.4 arm. It is interesting that points C and C' nearly coincide, with
T = 6.1 K, v = 11.6 cm3/g, u = 18.7 J/g, m _ 21.5 kg, and rh _ 169.5
g/s. Small differences in m and • result in the subsequent divergences
of the curves.
If the second relief path opens at C and C', the maximum flow rate
doubles, as shown by the second part of equation (10), and the curves
proceed along the lower branches. The pressure levels off at approxi-
mately 3 atm in both cases.
If, however, the second burst disk does not rupture, the curves
continue along the upper branches. We see that the dewar which was
initially normal reaches a maximum pressure of approximately 5 atm, before
leveling off at 4.7 atm, and the initially superfluid dewar reaches a maxi-
mum pressure of appro_imately 5.2 atm before leveling off at approximately
5 atm.
Times, t and t', after first burst diaphragm relief are shown on the
curves for normal and superfluid dewars, respectively. The mass of
fluid remaining in the dewar when the curves go off the figure are shown
at the end points as m and m', respectively. The minimum room temper-
ature proof pressure specified for the liquid helium dewar is 90 psi
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(6.1 atm), and the burst pressure is 120 psi (8.2 atm). Therefore, we
see that, even if only one relief path opens, the dewar will safety vent
at 3 kW heat flux without exceeding 85 percent of proof pressure or 63
percent of burst pressure.
To estimate the maximum heat input that the dewar relief system
could tolerate, the calculation was made for several heat loads greater
than 3 kW. To simplify this task a 5 s time interval was used. It was
found that if 5 and l0 s calculation intervals were used for the 3 kW case,
the maximum and final pressures were somewhat greater than for the 1 s
2
cases. Therefore, we conclude that the maximum and final pressures for
the 5 s calculations will be somewhat more severe than for more accurate
calculations. In all cases P occurred several time intervals before the
max
dewar was empty, and Pfinal was less than Pmax"
Table I summarizes the results of the calculations, showing maximum
pressure reached and approximate time to empty the dewar, with one or
two relief paths open and for several heat fluxes. We see that with only
one relief path open, a 6 kW heat input would just bring the system to
the dewar burst pressure; but with both relief paths open, the pressure
remains below dewar burst at a heat flux of more than l0 kW. Given the
reliabilities of properly designed and tested burst diaphragms, it is virtu-
ally certain that both relief paths would be open, if the pressure rose
above 4.4 atm.
At least two factors exist which would tend to make the preceding
results even less serious in a real accident.
Fir:st, we noted that the actual area of the liquid helium vessel is
approximately 12 pereent less than the value used in the heat flux esti-
mate. Consequently, the 3 kW heat flux originally determined from Figure
3 would be reduced to approximately 2.6 kW.
Second, as previously indicated, the dewar would almost certainly
not be full when the postulated aecident occurs. A partially full dewar
would take longer to reach the relief point than indicated by equation (3)
and would have less mass to be removed. For this case, calculations were
made at 5 s intervals for normal and superfluid dewars which are initially
half full and which relieve through a single path. The results show that
the time from puncture until relief begins [equation (3)] rises from 23 to
122 s for the normal dewar and from 24 to 196 s for the superfluid dewar.
In both cases the pressure closely approached, but did not exceed, the
corresponding pressure for the full dewar case.
o The pressures for the 10 s interval were approximately 0.4 atm greater
and those for the 5 s interval approximately 0.1 atm greater than the
pressures found in the 1 s interval calculation.
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Because the burst diaphragm r='A,A pressure has a tolerance of +0.4
atm, a calculation was made for the full superfiuid dewar, assuming the
burst disks did not open until the pressure reached 4.8 arm. Although
the initial behavior was somewhat different, a_ approximately 95 s after
relief the 4.8 atm curve had returned to the orig_inal 4.4 atm curve
(Fig. 4).
• ",_TABLE 1 DEWA]¢ PRESSURE LIMIT AND VENT T,,IE FOR
INITIALLY FULL DEWAR, _5 PSID BURST DIAPHRAGMS
One Relic/" Path Two Relief Paths
Heat Flux Pmax Time To Empty a Pmax Time To Empty a
(RW) (atm) (s) (atm) (s)
Nor,:al It elium
b
3
6
8
10
5.0
8.2 c
2f10
140
4.4
5.4
6.5
7._
160
95
85
75
Superfluid Helium
3
6
8
10
5.2
8.2 c
245
170
4.4
5.4
6.6
7.7
205
125
105
95
a. Approximate time from first relief.
b. Based on calculation with l s interval, all others based on 5 s interval.
c. Dewar burst pressure specification at room temperature.
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RELIEF CALCULATIONS, 115PSID BURST DIAPHRAGMS
As indicated previously, the burst diaphragms actually used in the
IRT dewar have measured relieving pressures at liquid helium temperature
of 115 psid or 7.8 atm. It is necessary, therefore, to consider how the
helium vents from the system under this higher pressure situation. In the
following we consider only the case of a dewar initially filled with super-
fluid helium, subject to a 3 kW heat load.
Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to address the apparent
disparity between the stated proof and burst pressures of the dewar, and
the higher pressure burst diaphragms. Appendix B discusses the as-built
conditions of the IRT dewar and indicates that the actual proof and burst
pressures at liquid helium temperature are approximately 265 psid and 356
psid, respectively, rather than the 90 psid and 120 psid, respectively,
which were specified to the dewar contractor for room temperature condi-
tions. Consequently, the I15 psid burst diaphragms will open at proof and
burst safety factors of 2.3 and 3.1, respectively.
The results of the new calculations are plotted with double-primed
symbols in Figure 5, which is an expanded version of Figure 4. When
the heating commences, the system is at point A" which, of course,
coincides with A'. Isochoric pressurization proceeds upward along the
v = 6.9 cm3/g curve until it reaches the burst diaphragm pressure of
7.8 atm, point B". Conditions at point B" are: T = 4.4 K, v = 6.9
cm3/g, u = 7.9 J/g, m = 31.25 kg. The weaker of the burst diaphragms
then ruptures at time t" = 0 and flow of supercritical helium begins
(n_ = 353 g/s) through a single vent path. Due to the high initialflow
rate, the pressure and flow rate drop rapidly. Within 8 s the system
pressure, has dropped below the 4.4 atm initialpressure of the relief
problems discussed previously.
The relief process is shown in Figure 5 through t" = 90 s. It is
seen that after approximately 40 s the process essentially falls on top of
the previously discussed case of a superfluid helium dewar venting
through a single 4.4 atm burst pressure relief path. The present calcu-
lation was carried further, though the results are not shown in Figure 5.
for clarity. The curve, in fact, follows the upper (primed) curve, reach-
ing a maximum pressure of 5.15 atm, then leveling off at 5.0 atm. The
curve leaves the area of Figure 5 at t" = 185 s and with a residual mass
of m" = 6730 g. The second burst diaphragm will not open, because the
pressure never rises to its rupture pressure. We see, therefore, that
the dewar is relieved completely and safely through a single relief path.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we state that the relief provisions of the IRT liquid
helium storage system are adequate. With a somewhat conservatively
estimated puncture accident in the dewar outer shell, the relief system of
two parallel burst diaphragm-relief valve circuits provides a comfortable
safety margin. In the event of any credible thermal accident, and with
the new higher pressure burst diaphragms, the cryogens can vent safely
through either one of the available relief paths alone.
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APPENDIX A
PRESSURE VESSEL CRITERIA
The Spacelab Payload Accommodation Handbook (SPAH), Sections
8.3.7 through 8.3.9 of Reference 4, discusses the definition of "pressure
vessel" and the restrictions on the use of pressure vessels, and on cryo-
genic storage. "A pressure vessel is a vessel containing a compressible
fluid w_th a stored energy greater than 19,310 J (14,240 ft-lb), equiv-
alent to 4.536 g (0.01 lb) TNT and having a credible explosive failure
mode, that is, failure based on explosive fracture of the vessel and not
merely on localized yielding or leakage."
The formula given in the SPAH for calculation of stored energy is
W = k-I -
where
W = energy (J)
P1 = vessel internal pressure (N/m 2)
P2 = ambient external pressure (N/m 2)
V I = gas volume or ullage in the vessel (m 3)
k = specific heat ratio = 1.67 for helium.
The IRT dewar system can operate essentially in four regimes,
each with a different internal energy, as defined previously:
1) Prior to launch the vessel internal pressure will be approxi-
mately 10 torr (0.013 atm), and the maximum normal ullage will be approxi-
mately 150 liters; we will assume a worst ease in these calculations and
let V =: 250 liters = 0.25 m 3. Then P1 = 0.013 atm = 1333.3 N/m2' P2 = 1
arm = 11.01 × 105 N/m 2 and
W _ 0.
2) If a catastrophic failure occurs prior to launch, as described
in the main body of this report, and relief venting is in progress, then
P = 5.2 atm = 5.3 × 105 N/m 2, and
1
W = 9.4 × 104 J.
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3) When the experiment is in space, the conditions of Case 1)
apply, but P2 = 0. Then
W = 500 J.
4) If a catastrophic failure should occur while in space, the
conditions of Case 3) apply, but P2 = 0. Then
W = 1.9 x 105 J.
Consequently, in Cases 2) and 4) the energy content of the IRT
dewar subsystem would appear to qualify it as a pressure vessel; how-
ever, the relief system described in this report will guarantee that follow-
ing a "credible" accident, explosive fracture cannot occur. Thus, it is
not obvious that the IRT dewar v,ould ever constitute a pressure" vessel
under the SPAH definition.
SPAH Section 8.3.7 states that pressure vessels which are not
constructed in compliance with NSS HP1740.1 or ASME Boiler and Pres-
sure Vessel Code must be tested to demonstrate fluid compatibility per
NSS HP1740.1. The IRT dewar was not constructed to these standards.
It will undergo extensive testing, including proof pressure test (See
Appendix B), acoustic excitation while containing liquid helium and while
in the horizontal (launch) attitude, and a test to ensure that, when the
experiment vent valves are closed prior to landing, the system will
relieve normall3, and safety through RV1 and RV3, and be secure for an
indefinite untended period.
i
APPENDIX B
AS-BUILT DEWARPRESSURES
When procurement of the IRT dewar was initiated, the contract
specification called for proof and burst pressures of 90 psig and 120
psig, respectively. These values were based on assumed availability of
burst diaphraff.ms which would open at 60 psid, slightly less than the 65
psid usecl in the present analysis. The respective proof (yield) and
burst safety factors represented by the dewar specification pressures
were, therefore, 1.5 and 2.0. It was implicitly understood that the
90 psig proof test would be performed at room temperature and that no
burst tests would be required.
After the dewar was delivered, it was found that we could not
acquire burst diaphragms which would fit into the available space in
the transfer assembly and which would open at less than about 115 psid
at liquid helium temperature, unless we incurred undesirable cost and
schedule delay,_. We therefore investigated the actual configuration of
the dewar and ]e:_rned that it was much stronger than the procurement
specification required and that when the increase in strength due to the
low temperature operation are taken into account, the actual safety fac-
tors on the system are greater than originally required.
The following summarizes the situation. The inner liquid vessel
of the IRT dewar is a welded cylinder of 6061-T6 aluminum, 0. 125 in.
thick, 28 in. i.d. and 2R in. long, with domed onds. According to the
dewar manufacturer, Cryo97enic Associates (CA), Inc., the vessel was
heat trea1:ed to the T6 condition after the weldinff w;is completed. From
Scet-_on 8, ASME Pressure Vessel Code. the, l_(_perlies of 6061-T6 are as
follows :
I00 ° F LHt_ Temperature
Tensile Stress 42,000 T_sJ 67,200 psi
Yield Stress 35,000 psi 50,000 psi
The ASME equation for the maximum pressure P(psi) in a cylindri-
cal vessel is given by
SEt
p -
R + 0.6t
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where S = stress (psi),
E = joint (weld) efficiency,
t = shell thickness (inch),
R = inside radius (inch).
CA conservatively estimates E to be 0.6. Therefore,
p
yield
Ptensile ultimate
100 ° F LHe Temperature
185 psid 265 psid
223 psid 356 psid
We see that even if we did not account for the increased strength of
the dewar at low temperatures, and simply compared the 115 psid burst
diaphragm relief pressure with the 100 ° F dewar pressures (as was done
in the section of this report on the 65 psid burst diaphragms), we
would have proof and burst safety factors of 1.6 and 1.94, respectively.
These are probably adequate in view of the analysis which shows the
safe venting of the dewar. When we account for the increased dewar
strength at low temperature, the proof and burst safety factors become
2.3 and 3.1, respectively.
2O
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